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ABSTRACT 
 
Reputation systems aim to reduce the risk of loss due to untrustworthy peers. This loss is aggravated by dishonest 
recommenders trying to pollute the recommendation network. The objective of an honesty checking mechanism is to 
detect dishonest recommenders. Existing honesty checking mechanisms assume that contradicting recommendations 
are due to the dishonesty of the recommenders. However, such difference may be also due to the behavior change of 
the  target  peer.  This  paper  shows  the  effect  of  such  behavior  change  on  the  performance  of  existing  honesty 
checking mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the  first attempt at linking the behavior change to 
honesty checking. 
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1    INTRODUCTION 
Being part in a peer-to-peer (P2P) system, a peer has the privilege of using pools of resources or services that 
would  not  be  available  to  it  otherwise.  Unfortunately,  the  idea  of  having  a  virtual  network  framework  is  not 
attractive because of the risk associated with the notion of “sharing” resources or services [6, 8, 9, 12]. Because of 
the sensitivity and the vitality of data or information, such peers prefer to use their own “closed box” resources. This 
is not just costly and inefficient way to utilize resources, but also negates the advantages of P2P systems. As such, 
one of the fundamental challenges in the open and decentralized P2P environments is the ability to mitigate the risk 
of transacting with untrustworthy peers [6]. 
Many researchers have proposed reputation systems [2, 4, 6, 14] to assess the trustworthiness of a peer based on 
recommendations obtained from other peers. Recommenders play a vital role in the success of any reputation system 
because based on their recommendations, a derived reputation score will be computed and used to decide whether a 
transaction should take place. A false recommendation can result in committing a transaction with untrustworthy 
peers or avoiding a transaction with trustworthy peers. Recommenders with different motivations and malicious 
intentions  can  cause  harm  in  such  systems.  Therefore,  mechanisms  to  filter  out  undesirable  recommenders  are 
fundamental and are an integral part of the success of any online reputation-based community [3, 14]. Recommender 
filtering  schemes  are  widely  used  in  the  literature  [7,  21,  9,  15,  6]  to  minimize  the  effect  of  the  undesirable 
recommenders in polluting the recommendation network 
Hence, the objective of a reputation system is to have recommenders that positively contribute to the computed 
reputation score. A positive contribution helps narrowing the gap between the derived reputation score and the 
actual trustworthiness of the peer in question. To positively contribute, a recommender should be willing, active, and 
honest.  Unwilling  recommenders  will  not  reply  nor  forward  a  recommendation  request.  Contacting  unwilling 
recommenders will not contribute at all to the derived reputation score but it will result in inefficient bandwidth 
utilization. Incentive  mechanisms are introduced to promote and encourage recommenders to participate in the 
recommendation  network  [13,  19].  Non-active  recommenders  will  provide  stale  recommendation  or  a 
recommendation based on few trans-actions with target peer. Many researchers have investigated recommender 
activeness by considering the number of transactions, their values, and when these transactions were performed [17, 
22]. 
Honesty checking has been also investigated by various researchers [7, 21, 9, 15, 6] but none has linked the behavior 
change of the peer in question to the honesty of recommenders. The primary goal of this paper is to shed light on the 
importance  of  this  issue  and  its  effect  on  recommenders'  honesty.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  no  existing 
literature tackles this issue, which we believe it is a vital dimension that should be considered when performing 
honesty checking. IJRRAS 3 (1) ● April 2010  Azzedin ●  Recommenders in Reputation Systems 
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This paper contributes to the honesty checking process by introducing another dimension that can affect the labeling 
of the dishonest recommenders. Existing honesty checking techniques [7, 21, 9, 15, 5] do not consider the behavior 
change a target peer as an important factor that might distort the image of a recommender. This issue is not tackled 
by  existing  literature  and  we  believe  that  such  an  issue  is  a  vital  dimension  that  should  be  considered  when 
identifying honest recommenders. 
Throughout this paper, we refer to the peer that wants to assess a reputation as a source peer and the peer whose 
reputation  is  assessed  as  a  target  peer.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the 
importance of honesty checking. Section 3 presents the performance metrics and the simulation setup to evaluate the 
existing mechanisms to filter out dishonest recommenders when the target peer changes its behavior. Also, results 
are presented and discussed in Section 3. Related works are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we conclude this 
paper  and  envision  future  directions  to  cope  with  the  target  peer's  behavior  change  and  its  effect  on  honesty 
checking. 
 
 
2    HONESTY CHECKING 
The objective of a reputation system is to have recommenders that positively contribute to the computed reputation 
score.  A  positive  contribution  helps  in  narrowing  the  gap  between  the  derived  reputation  score  and  the  actual 
trustworthiness of the target peer. To positively contribute, a recommender should be willing, active, and honest. 
Unwilling recommenders will not reply nor forward a recommendation request. Contacting unwilling recommenders 
will  not  contribute  at  all  to  the  derived  reputation  score  but  it  will  result  in  inefficient  bandwidth  utilization. 
Incentive mechanisms are introduced to promote and encourage recommenders to participate in the recommendation 
network [13, 19]. Non-active recommenders will provide stale recommendation or a recommendation based on few 
transactions with the target peer. Many researchers have investigated recommender activeness by considering the 
number of transactions, their values, and when these transactions were performed with the target peer [17, 22]. In 
this paper, we focus on the honesty aspect of the recommenders. 
Reputation systems aim to reduce the risk of loss due to untrustworthy peers. This loss is aggravated by dishonest 
recommenders trying to pollute the recommendation network. The objective of an honesty checking mechanism is to 
detect dishonest recommenders. Existing honesty checking mechanisms assume that contradicting recommendations 
are due to the dishonesty of the recommenders. However, such difference may be also due to the behavior change of 
the  target  peer.  This  paper  shows  the  effect  of  such  behavior  change  on  the  performance  of  existing  honesty 
checking mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at linking the behavior change to 
honesty checking. 
Relying on recommenders to estimate the reputation of the target peer, the source peer might be misinformed and 
form the wrong perception about the target peer. This is due to dishonest recommenders that try to pollute the 
environment by intentionally giving bogus reputation reports. Ideally, dishonest recommenders should be prevented 
from contributing to the target peer reputation. Measuring honesty is a dif cult task because in order for a source 
peer to determine the honesty of a recommender, the source peer needs to know what the recommender beliefs in. 
Since, this is impossible in P2P systems, most of the existing honesty checking algorithms [15, 9, 21, 7] use the 
consistency  of  the  recommendation  with  an  expected  value  in  measuring  honesty.  In  these  honesty  checking 
schemes, a recommender is marked as dishonest if it provides a recommendation that contradicts the expected value. 
In other  words, existing  honesty checking algorithms assume that if a recommendation is not  in  line  with the 
expected value, then the recommender is the one to blame. On the contrary, the recommender might be honest and is 
reporting a behavior change of the target peer, while the expected value is reporting the old behavior of the target 
peer. Therefore, if there is an oscillating target peer that changes its behavior from trustworthy to untrustworthy, or 
vice versa, then such oscillating target peer will affect the recommenders' honesty. 
A behavior change may be due to the target peer's attempt to gain pro t by building up its reputation and using it to 
perform untrustworthy transactions without being noticed. On the other hand, a behavior change can happen if a 
trustworthy peer is compromised by an untrustworthy peer and used to launch attacks. 
 
 
3    PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
3.1     Simulation Setup and Performance Metrics 
The objective of our simulation experiments is to measure the effect of the target peer's behavior change on the 
performance of existing honesty checking mechanisms. The simulation is a discrete event simulation. We use 1024 
peers in constructing the overlay network and the number of transactions is 1024. We assume that all recommenders 
are honest, and when the nth transaction is attempted, the recommendations from the previous (n 1) transactions are IJRRAS 3 (1) ● April 2010  Azzedin ●  Recommenders in Reputation Systems 
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available. We have one target peer that  would behave  in an oscillating  manner, switching  from trustworthy to 
untrustworthy and vice versa. The starting behavior is trustworthy. 
We simulate four honesty checking mechanisms, namely, filtering for Bayesian reputation system (BF) [21], outlier 
filtering (OF) [7], feedback consistency (FC) [9], and credibility factor (CF) [15]. If a recommendation is considered 
dishonest, the recommender is marked as dishonest and its recommendations are no longer accepted. The thresholds 
are set to 2.0, 0.01, and 0.5 for t in OF, q in BF, and T in FC respectively as used in [7, 21, 9]. 
For  the  performance  metrics,  we  observe  the  number  of  recommenders  misdetected  as  dishonest  due  to  the 
oscillating behavior of the target peer. We experiment with behavior oscillation every 1 and 5 transactions. We 
calculate the reputation throughout the simulation to see if the transaction attempts are committed. 
A recommendation contains the number of trustworthy and untrustworthy transactions committed with the target 
peer. In computing the derived reputation score, the basic Bayesian reputation system as described in [10] is used. 
This  is  done  for  all  of  the  honesty  checking  mechanisms.  We  also  measure  the  global  reputation  (GR)  if  all 
recommendations are used (no honesty checking is involved). The reputation value ranges from 0 to 1 and a peer is 
considered to be trustworthy if its reputation is 0.5. A transaction attempt is only committed if the target peer is 
predicted to be trustworthy. 
 
3.2     Results and Discussion 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the number of misdetected honest peers and the global reputation if the target peer 
changes its behavior in every transaction. We can see that BF marks a high number (62.659%) of the recommenders 
as dishonest at the end of the simulation. The reputation of the target peer in BF is consistently high (>= 0.9) most of 
the time, indicating that peers reporting the untrustworthy behavior of the target peer are marked as dishonest. The 
marking starts when the target peer has had numerous transactions. In other words, the recommenders are punished 
for the target peer's behavior change if the target peer has performed many transactions. 
Similar results are also shown by FC, although at a lower degree. At the end of the simulation, 32:454% of the peers 
are marked as dishonest. When the target peer performs an untrustworthy transaction, the consistency of the source 
peer decreases, and if it is the first transaction for the source peer, the source peer's feedback consistency is 0, thus, 
marked as dishonest. The reputation of the target peer in FC is lower than in BF; however, the target peer is still 
always considered trustworthy if the threshold of trustworthiness is less than or equal 0:6. 
In OF, none of the recommenders are marked as dishonest because positive and negative recommendations have the 
same frequency when the behavior change occurs. It keeps the normalized value to be less than the threshold. It 
means recommendations from all peers are used throughout the simulation. This is shown by the reputation values 
which are equal to GR. This also means that all transaction attempts with the target peer are committed. 
Using CF, only one recommender is marked as dishonest. The marked recommender is the one re-porting the first 
transaction of the target peer because in the second transaction attempt, the target peer is untrustworthy. Hence, the 
positive recommendation from the first recommender is no longer used and only the negative recommendation from 
the second recommender is available. This is reflected in the reputation of the target peer which is consistently low 
showing that the target peer is isolated in the rest of the simulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Misdetected honest peer (N  =1). IJRRAS 3 (1) ● April 2010  Azzedin ●  Recommenders in Reputation Systems 
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Figure 2. Global reputation of the target peer (N  = 1).
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the number of misdetected honest peers and the global reputation if the target peer 
changes its behavior in every 5 transaction. Similar to the previous results, BF and FC mark 63.148% and 32.845% 
of the recommenders as dishonest, respectively, at the end of the simulation. All transaction attempts with the target 
peer are committed. 
 
OF, also fails by misdetecting 39.198% of the recommenders. When the behavior change occurs, the target peer has 
invested 5 positive recommendations, so the normalized value for the negative recommendation is -2.041 which is 
outside the threshold. Hence, the recommender reporting the untrustworthy behavior is marked as dishonest. As the 
simulation continues, target peer gets more positive recommendations, and more peers reporting the untrustworthy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Misdetected honest peers (N  = 5). IJRRAS 3 (1) ● April 2010  Azzedin ●  Recommenders in Reputation Systems 
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behavior are filtered out. The reputation of target peer in OF is also very high. CF, again, isolates the target peer 
while marking the recommenders reporting the earliest behavior of the target peer. 
 
The results show that checking the honesty by observing the pattern of the recommendations may lead to the failure 
of predicting the current behavior. If the target peer changes its behavior, it is dif cult for the source peer to predict 
the result of the current transaction attempt based on the past transactions. CF succeeds because it uses only the 
latest  behavior,  but  it  would  punish  the  recommenders  reporting  the  old  behavior.  If  the  target  peer  performs 
numerous trustworthy transactions before becoming untrustworthy, CF would mark many peers as dishonest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Global reputation of the target peer (N  = 5). 
 
 
4    RELATED WORK 
Some reputation systems do not specifically tackle the honesty issue by correlating honesty and trust-worthiness 
[11, 13, 20], i.e., they assume that trustworthy peers provides honest recommendation and untrustworthy peers 
provide dishonest recommendations. Such reputation systems are vulnerable to badmouthing attacks. A trustworthy 
peer might provide dishonest recommendation to isolate other competing trustworthy peers and consequently to 
increase  his  profit.  Other  reputation  systems  [1,  16,  23]  assume  that  the  majority  of  the  peers  are  honest  and 
therefore cancel the effect of dishonest ones on the recommendation network. 
The reputation system in [6] uses reply consistency to predict honesty. Consistent peers are assumed to be honest 
and vice versa. Each peer has a set of trusted allies through whom consistency check is performed. The checking is 
done  by  asking  one  or  more  of  the  trusted  allies  to  send  recommendation  request  for  the  target  peer  to  the 
recommender. The source peer would compare the recommendation it gets directly with the one received by the 
trusted allies. Assuming the requests come in relatively short time, the recommender should give answers with no or 
little  value  difference.  Therefore,  if  the  difference  is  more  than  certain  threshold,  the  recommender  is  being 
inconsistent. The recommender would be replaced from the source peer's recommender list and marked as dishonest 
so that it would not be included again in the list. However, this method can not detect dishonest peers that provide 
consistent replies. 
A method to filter out dishonest feedbacks for Bayesian reputation systems is presented in [21]. Bayesian reputation 
systems use the beta distribution in predicting a peer's reputation using the number of trustworthy and untrustworthy 
transactions as the distribution parameters. The parameters of the distribution are: 
1   T N   
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where  T N  and  U N  are the number of trustworthy and untrustworthy transactions with the target peer reported by 
the recommender respectively. Honesty checking is performed by identifying feedbacks whose expected probability 
is less than the probability density function (PDF) at a certain quantile, q, and those exceeding the PDF at (1 - q) 
quantile in the beta distribution of the aggregated recommendations. The recommenders providing those outliers are 
considered to be dishonest. The checking is performed iteratively until the all recommendations are within the PDF 
at [q, 1 - q] quantile. 
In  [7],  an  honesty  checking  mechanism  is  proposed,  inspired  by  the  concept  in  [21].  Recommendations  are 
categorized in positive and negative recommendations, and values of 1 and 0 are assigned to them, respectively. If 
there are contradicting recommendations, these values are normalized so that their mean and standard deviation are 
0 and 1, respectively. A threshold, t, is used to remove recommendations whose associated normalized values are 
t    or   . t  . 
 
Transactions are evaluated by both the source peer and the target peer in [9]. A source peer's feedback is considered 
consistent if it agrees with the target peer's self-evaluation. Assuming most of the peers are trustworthy and honest, 
most inconsistencies would be in the case  that the source peer reports a trustworthy transaction as untrustworthy 
(badmouthing) or an untrustworthy transaction as trustworthy (collusion to boost the target peer's reputation). Thus, 
a source peer is suspected to be providing false feedbacks if the proportion of inconsistent feedbacks exceeds certain 
threshold, T. Feedbacks from inconsistent peers are no longer accepted. 
 
The  reputation  system  in  [15]  uses  a  measurement  called  credibility  factor.  The  credibility  factor  increases  if  a 
recommender  provides  a  recommendation  that  matches  the  actual  result  of  the  transaction.  From  the  credibility, 
discredibility factor can be derived. A recommender whose discredibility factor is higher than its credibility factor 
will be filtered out. 
 
The  honesty  checking  in  [18]  also  compares  the  recommendations  to  the  actual  result  of  the  transaction,  if  the 
transaction  is  committed.  A  feedback  rating  of  1  is  given  to  recommenders  whose  recommendations  match  the 
transaction results whereas recommenders that provide contradicting recommendations get feedback rating of 0. The 
feedback rating is used to determine the acceptance of recommendations from the recommenders in next reputation 
assessment. 
 
 
 
5  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
A peer has the motivation to change its behavior in order to pursue its own interest. Even worse, the behavior 
change may be due to a security breach to a trustworthy peer. Such behavior change, as shown in the experiments 
carried out in this paper, can have tremendous effect on misdetecting honest recommenders. 
 
Recommenders reporting the new behavior are misdetected as dishonest in mechanisms that assume the honest 
recommendations are the ones that follow the mainstream opinion such as in the Bayesian filtering and outlier 
filtering.  While  systems  that  compare  the  recommendations  to  the  current  behavior  misdetect  recommenders 
reporting the old behavior as in the credibility factor. The change of behavior also affects the detected honesty in the 
feedback consistency. Misdetecting honest recommenders would reduce the availability of honest recommendations 
and  may  result  in  an  incorrect  derived  reputation  score,  which  would  lead  committing  a  transaction  with  an 
untrustworthy peer or avoiding a transaction with a trustworthy peer. As a future work, we are currently working on 
an honesty checking mechanism that considers the behavior change of the target peer in measuring the honesty of 
the recommenders. 
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